



A Study of Legal Inadequaciest
It has been over thirty years since the first atomic bomb was exploded at a
test site in the New Mexico desert. In that relatively short timespan the concept
and manifestations of nuclear energy-from reactors to weapons stockpiles-
have spread the world over. With nuclear energy has spread a whole body of new
law: nuclear law, which transects such diverse fields as national and interna-
tional private law (regulating liability for nuclear damage), international public
law (creating agencies and endowing them with authority to apply safeguards),
and national public law in the forms of constitutional and administrative law
(regulating the organization, licensing, and supervision of nuclear activities), as
well as criminal law (providing sanctions for offenses against nuclear regula-
tions).
Two major trends became apparent during this period: a very slow and still
restricted increase in the number of nuclear weapons states to the present six,
and a much more rapid increase in the spread of peaceful nuclear power tech-
nology. The prime focus of international concern and discussion has been to
stop the former trend while enhancing the latter, and international public law
has responded to that challenge, beginning in 1956 with the establishment of
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In the nearly two decades
since the writing of the IAEA Statute, a series of Agency conferences and
resolutions has produced a fairly comprehensive system of international safe-
guards designed to detect any significant diversion of nuclear materials by a
non-nuclear-weapon state from its peaceful sources of nuclear energy to a
clandestine weapons program.
Alongside this IAEA activity has been a large body of bilateral, trilateral, and
multilateral accords in the safeguards field, culminating in the 1968 Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).'
*B.A., Stanford University; J.D. Candidate, University of California, Davis Law School.
tEditor's note: Because of the time lag between submission of the manuscript and date of publi-
cation, the author desires to append a caveat that the statistics and technical data contained herein
may not now be completely current.
'21 U.S.T. 483. (Entered into force, 1970).
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But while the efforts of nuclear law have been directed against nuclear pro-
liferation by the world's non-nuclear-weapon states, little attention has been
given to the problem of the dramatic increase in non-governmental-i.e.,
terrorist, or organized criminal-violence and the potential for such violence to
become nuclear. A few preliminary questions have begun to be asked in
national and global forums: what groups would want to steal nuclear material
and for what purpose? What resources would they need and how easy are such
resources to acquire? And, most importantly, do international safeguards
effectively deal with the threat of non-governmental diversion of nuclear
materials? It is these questions which this article will explore, in the course of a
broader discussion on the present breakdown of nuclear law in the face of
nuclear terrorism and sabotage.
The Diversionary Potential
In October, 1970, a letter was sent to Orlando, Florida, threatening that the
city would be blown up by a hydrogen bomb unless the writer were given $1
million and safe passage out of the United States. The letter included a diagram
of a device which the local police showed to an Air Force armament officer, who
said that it would probably work. When alarmed city officials contacted the
then-Atomic Energy Commission (now split into two offices, the Environmental
Research and Development Administration, and the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission), the most they could be assured of was that there were no missing
shipments or overt displacements of nuclear materials. The million dollars was
actually assembled, but the perpetrator of the threat was discovered before the
ransom could be paid: he was a 14-year-old honors science student.
This incident highlights a number of deficiencies in the nuclear safeguards
system and the ability of that system to cope with a criminal threat. First is
revealed the fact that design aspects of an atomic bomb are beyond neither the
research access or intelligence of an ordinary, intelligent citizen. Second, al-
though understanding how a bomb works, and actually constructing a workable
device are orders of magnitude apart, in terms of technical skills and equip-
ment needed, the mere existence of a workable drawing alone can pose a
credible threat. And finally, the AEC could not assure Orlando-or any city-
that there were no covert displacements of nuclear materials, displacements so
small and made over such a period of time that they could escape detection.
The 14-year-old never revealed the motive behind his hoax, but a number of
motives for a nuclear theft, and the types of groups that would attempt such a
theft, can be easily ascertained. Two basic incentives are the political leverage
and/or the monetary profit that the holders of a homemade atomic bomb could
acquire. Such holders could be an organized criminal group, political terrorists,
or perhaps members of an opposition political faction within a nation.
The incentives sharpen their focus when it is seen that stolen nuclear material
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which can be used to make weapons has a commercial value of between $3,000
and $15,000 per kilogram, depending on the substance stolen (uranium or
plutonium) and its technical grade.2 On the other side of the balance should be
weighed the criminal penalties for unlawfully possessing or manufacturing an
atomic weapon: in the United States such an offense is punishable by a fine up
to $10,000 or 10 years imprisonment, or both; if the intent of the defendant is to
injure the United States or obtain an advantage for a foreign nation, the
maximum penalty becomes $20,000 and/or life imprisonment.'
To the organized crime operative, perhaps one who has not been deterred by
similar penalties from committing homicides or extortion, the lucrative nature
of a nuclear theft may well outweigh the risks and sanctions of apprehension.
And the fanaticism which political terrorists have exhibited in the commission
of their worldwide bombings and kidnappings, even at the cost of their own
lives, indicates that criminal sanctions for nuclear theft would be a weak deter-
rent indeed.
The uses to which nuclear material stolen by such groups can be put are many
and varied:
" it can be sold back to the nation from which it was stolen;
* it can be sold to a second nation eager to acquire nuclear weapons but
unwilling to divert its own nuclear power plant materials due to the risk
of IAEA detection;
* it can be sold upon a nuclear black market;4
" accompanied by a threat to explode a device in a large city, it can be used
to obtain political concessions (e.g., redistribution of wealth: the SLA's first
demand; acquisition of territory: an early demand of the Black Muslims;
release of prisoners: a recurring PLO demand; or perhaps the withdrawal
of a foreign military presence: the Vietnamese NLF);
" or, in the case of a rival political faction, the threat of a nuclear explosion
can be a means of ousting the present government, an especially credible
means in those many nations where force and violence are the most often
used tools for transferring governmental power.
2MASON WILLRICH and THEODORE R. TAYLOR, NUCLEAR THEFT: RISKS AND SAFEGUARDS,
(Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1974), ch. 6, p. 107.
142 U.S.C. § 2272 (1970); for fines & penalties concerning communication of, receipt of, and
tampering with restricted data, see §§ 2274-6.
'Though the chances of any such market presently developing are slim, any one or more future
nuclear thefts would increase the chances and motives for such a market; once so formed, a black
market would then further increase the potential for nuclear theft. In the opinion of then-AEC
Commissioner Clarence E. Larson at a 1969 Safeguards Symposium, "Once special nuclear
material is successfully stolen in small and possibly economically acceptable quantities, a supply-
stimulated market for such illicit materials is bound to develop." (Quoted in Nuclear Hijacking:
Now Within the Grasp of Any Bright Lunatic, Timothy Ingram, THE WASINGTON MONTHLY.
vol. 4, No. 11, January 1973, p. 25.)
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The key issue concerning all these potential motives for diversion is "are such
risks credible?" Certainly, in the case of terrorism, the risks of such groups
going nuclear are increasing, considering (1) the growing amount and intensity
of terrorism in recent years; (2) the increased technological capacity and sophis-
tication of such groups (note the January, 1974 Surface-to-Air Missile threat at
London's Heathrow Airport); and (3) the developing international links between
such groups to aid the flow of information, personnel, and arms.
Moreover, international legal norms are not sufficiently honored when certain
nations show a willingness to shelter terrorist groups and their -conventional
weapons stockpiles; indeed, in many parts of the Third World, the norms act to
encourage such shelter for terrorists in their guise as "revolutionaries in the
struggle for national liberation." Such nations might be willing as well to host a
clandestine nuclear bomb manufacturing operation, and to provide a safe haven
after the nuclear threat has been delivered.
Even without such a haven, present national and international legal sanc-
tions-extradition, or guaranteed prosecution, with long prison sentences and
possibly death-seem unlikely deterrents against terrorist ardor.
It should be noted that the chances of any group--criminal, terrorist, or
political faction-are enhanced if they include among their number an
employee or employees of a nuclear power plant; such individuals possess the
necessary access to nuclear materials, as well as the key knowledge concerning
(1) the in-plant physical security system, (2) the amount of material that could
be stolen over time and remain undetected, and perhaps (3) technical bomb-
making capabilities.
This threat of diversion by plant insiders can be countered in the field of
public administrative law by the setting up of stringent personnel screening and
security clearance regulations in nuclear industry. But once again, nuclear law
faces serious roadblocks in its attempts to prevent non-governmental nuclear
theft: requiring full employee security clearances may be opposed by manage-
ment as too expensive, by labor as violative of employment practices reached
through collective bargaining agreements, and by local government as a denial
of equal opportunity employment regulations. Already this latter factor has
been expressed by elements of nuclear industry committed to hiring the
hardcore unemployed, the very people for whom screening presents the most
problems. I
'Remarks of David J. Haymon, Assistant to the Manager, Operations, Nuclear Fuel Division,
Westinghouse Electric Corp., in International Inspection of U.S. Industry, in PREVENTING
NUCLEAR THEFT: GUIDELINES FOR INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENT, Leachman and Althoff, eds.
(New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 171.
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Technical Considerations
The three essential elements needed to successfully divert nuclear materials
and create an effective explosive are knowledge, skilled manpower, and
materials. Regarding knowledge, all the information required for the design
and construction of a number of crude nuclear explosives is available, pub-
lished, and largely unclassified.
As to skilled manpower, there are thousands of people in the world today who
have direct experience in the design, construction, and testing of nuclear ex-
plosives. Moreover, tens of thousands of others possess the specific knowledge
of various technical skills required to make a nuclear bomb. And, indeed, there
are millions of others-engineers, scientists, technicians-who have a basic
working knowledge in the necessary scientific fields involved. People in any of
these categories can be kidnapped or persuaded to join a clandestine operation.
Or they may already be part of one voluntarily.
The conventional explosives, and other materials needed to construct the
actual device as well as ignite the nuclear chain reaction are easily obtainable
throughout the developed world, either by purchase or theft. Such materials
should be no harder, and probably much easier, to acquire than the fissionable
nuclear material itself for the bomb's core. At this point it is necessary to
examine in more detail the nuclear fuel cycle, since the special nuclear material
(SNM) that has been discussed all along, supra, is the same for both reactor fuel
and nuclear explosives.
The most commonly used SNM in the nuclear fuel cycle (see Chart I on page
4986) are uranium in its U-235 isotopic form, and plutonium in its Pu-239 form.'
'Victor Gilinsky, Military Potential of Civilian Nuclear Power, in NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION:
PROSPECTS FOR CONTROL, Mason Willrich, ed., (Cambridge, Mass.: Dunellen, 1970), p. 47.
'Natural uranium contains only minute amounts of U-235, and must be slightly enriched at a
nuclear enrichment facility to be of use in most modern reactors. After this step, the uranium goes
to a fuel fabrication plant, is converted into a powder, compressed into pellets, loaded into fuel
rods, then sent to a reactor. During reactor use, part of this uranium is converted into Pu-239, but
both such elements are highly radioactive at this stage and must be handled with heavy shielding
equipment when the old fuel rods are removed and replaced each year.
In light of the nuclear fuel cycle chart, the fuel fabrication plant becomes the key point in the fuel
cycle for diversionary activity: uranium before the enrichment stage is not usable in an explosive,
while U-235 or Pu-239 in the fuel wastes after reactor use and before reprocessing is far too radio-
active to be handled. It is at the fuel fabrication stage that the SNM is in a clean (i.e., not too highly
radioactive), solid (powder or pellet), easily transportable form, and thus, the easiest form to be
diverted. In addition, the fuel fabrication process results in the production of dust and scrap con-
taining some amount of SNM; this waste is difficult to account for precisely, making possible a theft
that would never be discovered. (The NRC, realizing it cannot keep track of all SNM throughout the
fuel cycle, has established certain standards of missing material which must be tolerated. This
figure, called "Material Unaccounted For" or MUF, for Pu is .5-1.0%. Source: 10 C.F.R, § 70.51,
1975.) Finally, the storage of SNM after this fabrication stage, and after the reprocessing stage, as
well as the transportation pathways between these stages (see chart, paths numbered 3, 4, and 7)
pose the likeliest targets for diversion.
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Although the slightly enriched U-235 reactor fuel is not suitable for direct use in
an explosive device, the Pu-239 produced, while difficult to use in an efficient
explosive, can be easily adapted to a crude bomb. However, one reactor type
now in limited use-the high-temperature gas cooled reactor (HGTR)-uses
highly enriched uranium (90% U-235) as a fuel; such fuel is weapons-grade.8
Under intense development is a new type of reactor-the Breeder-which will
be capable of using either highly enriched U-235 or Pu-239 for fuel. Both such
SNM are weapons-grade. It is estimated that as little as 20 kg. of U-235, or
5 kg. of Pu-239 could form the basis of a workable nuclear explosive. 9
As noted in the chart, the plutonium produced in nuclear reactors can be
reprocessed and recycled into the system as a reactor fuel. The economic in-
centive to begin large scale Pu recycling increases as natural uranium reserves
are depleted, but present United States safety, environmental, and security
factors have caused a delay in the Pu recycle. As a result, Pu produced domes-
tically is now largely stored, still highly radioactive, at the various reactor sites;
some reprocessing (which lessens radioactivity) is being done on a demonstra-
tion basis and for research and development purposes.
Europe and Japan by contrast face different pressures concerning the start of
Pu recycling: since these areas contain little natural uranium deposits, and are
more dependent on OPEC oil, they may be more inclined to begin large scale
recycling sooner than the United States. It must be noted that even before the
start of large scale United States recycling, the amounts of domestic, non-
military SNM (the demonstration Pu-239 plus highly enriched U-235) that are
low enough in radioactivity to be safely transported-and thus diverted-is
calculated by one weapons design and control expert to be "of the order of
several thousand kilograms. This is sufficient for the construction of hundreds
of nuclear explosives.""0
The general potential for diversion described above becomes alarmingly
focused when seen in the perspective of the growth of the world's nuclear power
'he fuel being used for the few existing HTGRs contains a great deal of graphite and other
elements that dilute the U-235 to a point where it cannot be used directly to make a bomb. However,
the fuel planned for HGTRs now on other may contain undiluted, and therefore directly-usable
weapons-grade U-235. Note also that from the output end of the enrichment plant to the point in the
fabrication plant where the graphite is added, and the transport steps in between, the U-235 is also
undiluted and directly usable.
'Theodore Taylor, Diversion by Non-Governmental Organizations, in INTERNATIONAL SAFE-
GUARDS AND NUCLEARINDUSTRY, Mason Willrich, ed., (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1973), p. 180.
I°Dr. Theodore Taylor, former nuclear weapons designer for the United States government, and
consultant to the AEC, the IAEA, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment. Quoted in "The Need for a Systems Approach to Preventing Theft of Special Nuclear
Materials," in Leachman and Althoff, op. cit., p. 219. Dr. Taylor estimates non-United States
inventories of SNM to be in the same range.
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industry (see Table 1 on page 501, current to 19741). Estimates of plutonium
accumulation in the civilian nuclear industry worldwide run to between 250,000
and 450,000 kg. by the early 1980s; even at the best MUF figure (a United
States measure; see footnote 7) there remains up to 1,250 kg. that could be
covertly stolen worldwide without discovery (not to mention an overt theft from
storage or transportation of a far greater amount). Even a crude explosive with a
low yield-made from less than 10 kg. Pu-239--could kill tens of thousands and
cause hundreds of millions of dollars of property damage in an urban area.
Fuel fabrication and reprocessing plants, as well as'reactors, are spreading
throughout the world, as is development in new enrichment techniques. As
these facilities spread, so widens the potential for SNM diversion; yet in the
sense that these plants are still limited in relation to the number of reactors
worldwide, there must necessarily be a great deal of global movement of
uranium and plutonium in various stages, with the concomitant risk of theft at
any point along such routes of transport. All such SNM transportation can
occur by conventional commercial air, rail, truck, and sea carriers, as well as by
special licensees. A chilling example of the risk involved can be found in the fact
that at least one, and probably more of the planes hijacked to Cuba in the last
decade contained SNM in amounts sufficient to make a bomb; fortunately, the
nature of the plane's cargo was not discovered by either the hijackers or Cuban
authorities, and the jets were returned intact. 1
With all the risks mentioned in the above discussion of nuclear fuel cycles, the
worldwide spread of atomic reactors and their plutonium byproduct, and the
growing transnational transportation of SNM, the system of international
safeguards becomes of crucial importance for study. What follows then is such a
study of that system: its highlights and gaps, its international legal underpin-
nings, and the reasons why, as it now exists, it is vastly unprepared to cope with
the threat of non-governmental nuclear diversion.
International Safeguards
Safeguards systems are expensive, causing constant budgetary quarreling
between drafters, industry, and government. The purposes behind an ideal
system may be many, but for reasons of economy, IAEA and national planners
generally choose a single purpose to highlight. In the case of the international
(IAEA) system, that purpose is the detection of SNM diversion by governments
from their peaceful nuclear power industry to a clandestine armaments in-
dustry. For most national systems, if they exist in a clear enough form to exhibit
a unified purpose, safeguards act to prevent the theft of SNM.
Concurrent with a choice of purpose is one of method, and for each of the two
"NUCLEAR THEFT, Op. Cit., p. 197.
2
"Nuclear Hijacking," op. cit., p. 24.
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Table 1-Foreign Nuclear Power, By Country*
No. of Installed No. of Installed
Power Capacity Power Capacity
Country Plants /MW(e)/ Plants /MW(e)/
Japan 5 1,756 41 '31,636
West Germany 7 2,082 22 14,995
United Kingdom 28 5,335 43 14,479
USSR 10 2,457 23 11,997
Sweden 1 440 13 10,060
France 6 2,481 12 7,281
South Africa - - 8 6,898
Canada 5 1,974 9 5,482
Switzerland 3 1,006 6 3,406
Taiwan - - 4 2,808
Korea - - 4 2,328
Italy 3 597 5 2,163
East Germany 1 70 5 1,830
Czechoslovakia - - 4 1,760
Belgium - - 3 1,650
India 3 600 8 1,610
Argentina - - 3 1,518
Finland - - 3 1,480
Mexico - - 2 1,200
Netherlands 1 55 3 1,105
Spain 3 1,100 3 1,100
Romania - - 2 880
Bulgaria - - 2 880
Austria - - 1 700
Brazil - - 1 626
Yugoslavia - - 1 600
Thailand - - 1 500
Philippines - - 1 420
Pakistan 1 125 1 325
Other (not yet
announced) - - - 28,000
TOTALS 67 20.078 231 161,000
*Table 1 shows for each country the present and 1980 projected numbers of power reactors and
the total electric generating capacity which these reactors represent. The "other" column includes
power reactors that have not yet been officially announced, but that are expected to be installed by
1980.
basic purposes is a most efficient and cost-effective method. Internationally the
method stresses materials accountancy; nationally, physical protection of SNM
is highlighted.
It should be seen that terrorist or criminal groups do not need a large nuclear
arsenal but only a small amount of SNM to pose a credible threat. And due to
their more limited resource base, such groups are more likely to deal with stolen
SNM in an already enriched or weapon-grade state. Since materials accoun-
tancy is not the best method to detect small losses over time, nor can it alone
prevent the theft of any large amount in a single attack, such an accountancy
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system offers no deterrence to the non-governmental diverter. Physical pro-
tection and personnel security measures do on the other hand provide a credible
deterrent.
Rather, a material accountancy system is much more useful against non-
nuclear-weapon state diverters who would need one or more fairly efficient
explosive devices, and the time and larger quantity of SNM needed to build such
an arsenal. That IAEA safeguards are designed as a hedge against
governmental diversion can be seen in the Agency Statute's expression of
objectives, written at the founding of the IAEA in 1956: "[The Agency] shall
ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or
under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any
military purpose."I 3
The IAEA Statute does not require any agency member to submit to com-
pulsory safeguards, but only creates a framework for controls, leaving members
able to decide whether to submit (and if so, to what controls). Fortunately, the
spread of nuclear weapons-making capabilities, and especially of peaceful
nuclear power capacity, has proceeded slowly enough since 1956 to match the
gradual development of improved IAEA safeguards and finally, the adoption of
the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Unfor-
tunately, the increased risk of non-governmental diversion, especially by ter-
rorists, developed far too recently to have been realized in 1956 or protected
against during the Agency's formative years.
The purpose of the NPT, though vague, seems as well to indicate an emphasis
on the detection of governmental diversion: "Each non-nuclear-weapon State
Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards ... for the exclusive pur-
pose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this
Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses
to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." 14 Though the NPT pro-
vides substantial additions to the non-compulsory IAEA Statute, it should be
kept in mind that these following described provisions, plus most other inter-
national or multilateral safeguards accords made at the time reflect a purpose
similar to the IAEA Statute and NPT Article III. And it must be remembered
how limited an application such a purpose has to the prevention of non-gov-
ernmental diversion.
In effect since March, 1970, the NPT contains three significant provisions:
1. each non-nuclear-weapon state which is a Party to the Treaty agrees
not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or any nuclear explosive
device (NPT, Article II);
1AEA Statute, Article II; as of June, 1972, 102 states were parties to the Statute.
"NPT, Article III, § 1.
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2. each non-nuclear-weapon Party is required to submit to IAEA safe-
guards through negotiations with the Agency to be begun within specified
time limits (NPT, Article III. § 1, § 4);
3. each nuclear-weapon Party agrees not to supply any non-nuclear-
weapon state (whether a Party or not) with certain types of nuclear items for
peaceful purposes, except subject to IAEA safeguards (Article III. § 2).11
A state not Party to the NPT, or having not yet concluded a safeguard agree-
ment with the IAEA, as required by the NPT, is not without some form of safe-
guards, however. Besides any existing national or regional safeguards systems
(Euratom), there could be found some 49 non-NPT agreements in force by
1972; most of these were trilateral arrangements between peaceful nuclear
power suppliers, receivers, and the IAEA. As member states of these agree-
ments ratify the NPT, the NPT's safeguard requirements would be substituted
for their previous arrangements; the United States has some 21 such trilateral
agreements. 16
By 1971, the IAEA had produced an extensive document entitled, "The
Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required
in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons." 17
This document contains detailed guidelines for a safeguards system, including
the role of the IAEA within any NPT states agreeing to the document, and those
states' rights to terminate the safeguards arrangement. By March of 1975, 44
states had concluded NPT safeguards agreements with the IAEA, with many of
these agreements following precisely the terms of the IAEA 1971 Document.
Thirty-three such agreements are currently in force, with 22 more under nego-
tiation.
The stated "Objective of Safeguards" in the 1971 Document represents the
first major international statement in the field to include (though only impli-
citly) nuclear diversion by non-governmental groups:
The Agreement should provide that the objective of safeguards is the timely detec-
tion of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear
activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices
or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detec-
tion. (Emphasis added.)"8
"Although only non-nuclear-weapon Parties must submit to IAEA safeguards, the United States
and Great Britain have declared their intention to allow IAEA safeguards upon all nuclear activities
except those with direct national security significance. It should also be noted that neither China nor
France have signed the NPT, although France has stated it is prepared to behave as a signatory. As
of July, 1974, 83 states had ratified the NPT, while 62 others had not yet signed or ratified; world-
wide concern remains with the 13 states of these 62 which have neither signed nor ratified and which
possess either a present or potential nuclear capacity: India, Israel, Spain, South Africa, Argentina,
Brazil, Portugal, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Algeria, Chile, Saudi Arabia, and North Korea. (Source of
1974 figures: The New York Times, July 5, 1974, p. 1.)
"U.S. Dept. of State, Treaties in Force, January 1, 1974, p. 295.
"IAEA Document INFCIRC/153, 1971.
"Ibid., Part II, 28.
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But another section of the Document (Part I, 19), and the section on Sanc-
tions in the IAEA Statute (Art. XII, § C) to which it refers, disclose a return to
an earlier Agency objective. A careful examination of this Statute section reveals
that the purpose of IAEA Sanctions (administered in the case of non-com-
pliance with Agency agreements) is to publicly embarrass and put pressure
upon the offending state by reporting any non-compliance to the United
Nations. Were a non-governmental diversion to occur, the state in which it took
place would be just as upset over the loss as the rest of the world, but world
pressure of the sort envisioned in IAEA sanctions can only produce a tightening
of state security for the future. Meanwhile, those who managed the successful
diversion, and who plan to threaten the use of or actually use a nuclear explo-
sive, would not be likely to feel subject to such world pressure.
The succession of IAEA documents above should illustrate a slow but
growing recognition on the part of the Agency that there exist other purposes to
which safeguards can be directed. But recognition of purpose must be followed
by implementation of new methods to realize any significant effects. And in this
implementation field the IAEA record is haphazard: hesitant advances followed
by loud retreats. An analysis of that record follows, in terms of Agency safe-
guards methods: hopeful aspects of their expansion, and the grim aspects of
their limitations.
IAEA safeguards comprise a limited materials accountancy system designed
more to detect a past diversion than prevent a future one. But as such safe-
guards come to include all nuclear material, and all stages of the fuel cycle,
diversion can be detected at a very early stage; thus detection can approach
prevention, and early detection act as a significant deterrent to all forms of
diversion. Similarly, as detection techniques improve to the point where they
provide an on-line picture of current material flows, they can act to prevent theft
through the ability to detect and apprehend stolen material in the very process
of its being stolen. Both the Agency and national research and development
programs are currently working on technological improvements in the field of
materials accountancy.
In March of 1972, the Agency convened a panel of experts to formulate re-
commendations for the physical protection of nuclear material. These recom-
mendations, published in a June 1972 IAEA document commonly known as the
"Grey Book,"1 9 include measures for the prevention of SNM theft from nuclear
plant sites, recognition of various hazards during transit of SNM, as well as
recommendations for a timely recovery system in case of completed thefts or
""Recommendations for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material," (Vienna: IAEA, June,
1972).
International Lawyer, VoL 10, No. 3
Safeguards Against Nuclear Theft
misrouting of SNM (this latter system to be developed in full coordination with
public security forces). Highlights of the Grey Book feature such ideas as
physical barriers, hard-to-counterfeit badges for all people with access to SNM,
external and internal patrols, monitoring and guarding of transported SNM,
and emergency response capabilities.
While such recommendations reflect a forceful start in the proper direction,
other vital areas of concern have received inadequate Agency treatment. For
example:
* no enrichment plant is subject to IAEA safeguards, and safeguards pro-
cedures for such plants are only in the developmental stage;
* the IAEA has no current responsibility for SNM physical security after
reprocessing, a point when significant amounts of Pu-239 are present;
* since IAEA agreements are (excluding Euratom) signed with individual
states, a special problem arises regarding transport of SNM over national
borders, including those of non-NPT Parties or non-IAEA members. (E.g.,
responsibility vis-vis the Agency may rest with either the exporting or im-
porting state, the SNM in transit and actually within the jurisdiction of a
third state; the third state may itself have no responsibility toward the
Agency and need not allow it to exercise any controls.)
The basic problem concerns a major reluctance on the part of both individual
nations and the Agency to have the latter infringe on the national sovereignty of
the former. Physical protection procedures, to be fully effective, need to be
integrated with police intelligence and surveillance methods; but the IAEA does
not want to become an international police agency, nor will individual nations
allow their closely guarded police intelligence systems regarding nuclear theft to
be compromised through international intervention.
The IAEA is reluctant to expand its role, perhaps fearing it would become too
politicized (like some other United Nations bodies) in the process; or perhaps
the Agency fears that to act too strongly, especially during a critical incident,
would destroy it and all the good it has quietly done so far. For whatever reason,
this crucial reluctance on the Agency's part is revealed even as it paves the way
into the new areas of physical protection of SNM embodied in its Grey Book.
The Grey Book recommendations stress at the very outset a reliance on national
protection systems, on not wanting to infringe on the sovereign rights of states,
and finally, on the state being the unit to initiate a request for advice (not the
Agency requiring anything of the state).
International nuclear law has reached an impasse: IAEA/NPT safeguards
stress materials accountancy techniques, but preventing non-governmental
nuclear diversion depends on physical protection, rewards, search and recovery
of stolen material, arrest or extradition of offenders, and criminal sanctions.
Since the IAEA has no police or judicial powers, nor does it seem eager to push
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for their acquisition, the extent of the role it can play in this field is to devise
recommended standards which can act as models for national safeguards
systems. Considering this IAEA weakness, the crucial point for further study
now becomes the effectiveness, or even existence of national physical protection
safeguards within and outside the United States.
National Safeguards Systems
Most United States safeguards, including all physical protection measures,
are imposed upon private industry operators of nuclear facilities as a condition
of obtaining and keeping a government license. A series of new, more stringent
regulations, which became effective only as recently as December, 1973, are
designed to prevent SNM theft "by the establishment and maintenance of a
physical protection system of: (1) protective barriers and intrusion detection
devices at fixed sites to provide early detection of an attack, (2) deterrence to
attack by means of armed guards and escorts, and (3) liaison and communica-
tion with law enforcement authorities capable of rendering assistance to counter
such attacks." 0
Realizing that theft is most likely to occur during transportation of SNM
between various steps of the fuel cycle, the regulations include such strict and
often costly provisions as follow:
* no more than 20 gr. Pu or 350 gr. high enriched uranium to be shipped by
passenger aircraft without special AEC (now NRC) approval;
* SNM shipped by truck must have 2 people in the vehicle plus either an
armed escort vehicle or a specially designed truck or trailer;
* armed guards must monitor all intermediate stops and intervehicle trans-
fers related to nuclear shipments;
* containers used in open trucks, railroad flat or box cars, or surface vessels
must weigh more than 500 lbs., and must be sealed and either locked or
carried in a locked vehicle.
But when one wades into the sections on in-plant physical protection, one
can easily understand why some nuclear experts admit, "[w]hat exists can be
aptly characterized as a regulatory jungle . . ., "I Even if all published require-
ments are carefully observed (itself a questionable assumption), it is still pos-
sible to transport up to 2 kg. Pu and up to 5 kg. high enriched uranium without
any special protective measures. Such gaps in the system, plus continued
criticism from both within and outside government prompted the then-AEC to
quietly conduct a special safeguards study.
2 010 C.F.R. § 73.1 (1975). Overall safeguards regulations can be found in 10 C.F.R. §§ 50, 70, &
73; all transport regulations discussed in the article come from 10 C.F.R. § 73.30-73.35.
21NUCLEAR THEFT, op. Cit., p. 102.
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Parts of this study were released by Senator Ribicoff (D-Conn.) in April,
1974; among the more significant of those sections released were a list of key
factors that have broadened the risk of nuclear theft: (1) the increase in urban
terrorism, characterized by the Patty Hearst kidnapping, (2) the widespread
dissemination of information on the construction of homemade nuclear
weapons, and (3) the increasing numbers of people-of varying psychological
attitudes-experienced in processing weapons-grade materials for nuclear
industry. Finally, the study concluded, "that the new regulations are in-
adequate and that immediate steps should be taken to greatly strengthen the
protection of special nuclear materials." 2
Turning to national safeguards systems outside the United States, one finds
fewer regulations, with a far different emphasis, and an alarming lack of
concern-at least in the public record-with physical security measures. Out-
side of perhaps the more security conscious socialist police states, government
regulations deal almost exclusively with reactor safety, food irradiation, third
party liability, and radiation protection as standards for governmental licensing
of nuclear facilities. Euratom (the European Atomic Energy Community), with
one of the most complex safeguards systems, stresses centralized and detailed
accountancy, field inspections, and the imposition of sanctions rather than a
physical protection approach. Part of the difference in emphasis between
United States and European systems can be explained in cultural and experi-
mental terms; for example, one specialist on European safeguards techniques
reports that among Euratom nations, no special transportation precautions
exist "largely because hijacking is not common to the European political land-
scape." 23 Other explanations for the lack of detailed physical protection
measures are that either such regulations are classified, or perhaps they do not
exist at all.
Only one conclusion can be made from the foregoing discussion on national
safeguards, and it is a dark one: if the international system leaves physical
protection largely up to each nation, and the individual nations' systems are
either weak or termed "inadequate" by their own authorities, then the pos-
sibility of successful non-governmental nuclear diversion looms very large
indeed. Some hope, though, may be found in the actions of a few nations, alone
or in small numbers, outside the safeguards field. Seen together, these actions
(described below) begin to form the first dim outline of an approach to nuclear
security encompassing the full reach of nuclear law; from prevention of theft,
22D.M. Rosenbaum, J.N. Coogin, R.M. Jefferson, D.J. Kleitman, and W.C. Sullivan, Special
Safeguards Study, unpublished. Excerpts appeared in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, April 30,
1974, p. S6621.
"Lawrence Scheinman, Safeguarding Nuclear Materials, BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS,
vol. 30, No. 4, April 1974, p. 35.
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they move through apprehension, recovery, criminal sanctions, and finally to
the enhancement of international norms-the fostering of a climate of hostile
public opinion against the spread, especially by illicit means, of nuclear
weapons.
Non-Safeguard Approaches to Nuclear Theft:
Selected Documents
The following documents represent unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral
attempts to cope with the threat of non-governmental nuclear diversion. Each
international document (i.e., all those below which concern agreements of 2 or
more nations) is the only one in its field currently on record, tending to make
their appearance together more random than integrated. But seen against the
backdrop of an imperfect international system fearing to infringe upon the
sovereignty of similarly imperfect and uncoordinated national systems, these
documents represent a fresh, fruitful approach.
1. Treaty on Extradition Between the United
States of America and the Republic of
Argentina of January 21, 197224
This treaty provides for the extradition, on a reciprocal basis, of persons
found in either state who have been charged with or convicted of certain
enumerated offenses by the judicial authorities of the other state. Among those
offenses listed in Article 2 is the following No. 13: "Unlawful manufacture, use,
distribution, supply, acquisition or possession, or theft of bombs, apparatus
capable of releasing nuclear energy ... ; manufacture, use, distribution,
supply, acquisition or possession, or theft of bombs . .. with the purpose of
committing an offense."
This section makes the extradition treaty significant, for it represents an
official, transnational recognition of the problem of non-governmental nuclear
diversion. Though its purpose is to prevent either state from being a safe haven
for nuclear terrorists or other diverters, its effect is felt primarily after a
diversion, and only indirectly in the sense of preventing diversion. Nonetheless,
it is a step in the right direction, but to be more fully effective, its example needs
to be followed by as many other nations as possible.
2423 U.S.T. 3501. (Entered into force September 15, 1972.) No other United States extradition
treaty includes such specific language on nuclear diversion. Most United States treaties in this field
were made a decade or more before the first atomic bomb; their relation to the nuclear problem can
only be made through the circuitous reading of language concerning extortion, or in a very few
cases, language concerning the use of explosives to endanger life.
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2. Organization of American States: Convention to
Prevent and Punish Acts of Terrorism2"
The signatories of this Convention agree to cooperate in the prevention and
punishment of terrorism, as defined by the Convention, including (among other
things) exchange of information and compliance with extradition requests.
'Terrorism' is defined with special emphasis upon "kidnapping, murder, and
other assaults against the life or physical integrity of those persons to whom the
state has the duty according to international law to give special protection, as
well as extortion in connection with those crimes." So defined, it excludes any
application to nuclear terrorism with its large-scale murder and extortion.
Perhaps this is too strict a reading, but even so, certain consequences are
apparent:
a. should a nuclear terrorist situation arise, some measure of interpretation
will be necessary to determine whether a nation involved is under any obliga-
tion imposed by this Convention;
b. to clarify this situation (which was tailor-made to the specific problem
of threats against diplomats), a further convention on the particular nuclear
aspects of terrorism might be needed or at least amendments to this Conven-
tion may need to be adopted;
c. if this Convention remains the definitional statement of terrorism for
the OAS, then it is significant that among those nations not signatories (as
of March, 1970) were Chile, Argentina, and Brazil: nations which are not
signatories to NPT either, and which will soon possess a nuclear power
capacity.
3. Council of Europe Committee of Ministers
Resolution on International Terrorism 6
This Resolution differs from the OAS Convention in that it defines terrorism
in terms of a number of categories of acts (unlawful seizure of aircraft, offenses
against diplomats, etc.), "or any terrorist act"; furthermore, it urges the gov-
ernments of member states, when receiving an extradition request, to "take into
consideration the particularly serious nature of those acts, inter alia: when they
create a collective danger to human life, liberty or safety;...
But, while the definitional language can be more easily seen to include
"
5Source: 10 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 255 (1971); Convention Done at Washington,
February 2, 1971. The only other international statement on this subject is the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplo-
matic Agents; United Nations Resolution 3166 (XXVII Session, Gen. Ass.), December 14, 1973.
This Convention has no application to a threat of nuclear blackmail.
"Source: 13 I.L.M. 471 (1974); adopted on January 24, 1974.
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nuclear theft and sabotage than that of the OAS Convention, this document
represents only a recommended guideline for action by member states.
4. An Act to Amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as Amended, and the
Atomic Weapons Rewards Act of 1955, and for Other Purposes27
This Act amends the Atomic Weapons Rewards Act of 1955 (69 Stat. 365) as
follows:
Any person who furnishes original information to the United States
(a) leading to the finding or other acquisition by the United States of special nuclear
material or an atomic weapon which has been introduced into the United States or
manufactured or acquired therein contrary to the laws of the United States, or
(b) with respect to the introduction or attempted introduction into the United States
or manufacture or acquisition or attempted manufacture or acquisition of, or a
conspiracy to introduce into the United States or to manufacture or acquire, special
nuclear material or an atomic weapon contrary to the laws of the United States, or
(c) with respect to the export or attempted export, or a conspiracy to export, special
nuclear material or an atomic weapon from the United States contrary to the laws of
the United States, shall be rewarded by payment of an amount not to exceed $500,000.
... A reward of $50,000 or more may not be made without the approval of the
President.
This Act is significant not only in terms of its specificity to the particular
diversionary problem, but also because-unlike the previous documents dis-
cussed-it deals fully and firmly with prevention. Five hundred thousand
dollars is a massive incentive toward the discovery of nuclear sabotage and theft
before it occurs, perhaps so much so that a widespread knowledge of this Act
could result in some diminution of certain suspected or reported individuals'
civil liberties. But the legislative choice has been made for protection of the
security of all citizens over the potential infringement of the rights of a few. In the
light of the global nature of the nuclear diversionary threat, perhaps such strong
action by the United States deserves to be followed elsewhere.
5. Preventing Unplanned Sabotage Through Planned Sabotage
In the spring of 1975, as Communist troops began their final offensive upon
South Vietnam, a team of Americans flew secretly to the site of the South's only
nuclear reactor, removed the nuclear fuel, and dynamited the reactor building.
The fuel was sent back to the United States to prevent its use by the approach-
ing North Vietnamese, who captured that city a week later.28
Conclusions and Proposals
All safeguards systems are caught in the grip of two opposite forces: to
prevent diversion a system must appear credible; but to exist at all, a system
"Pub. L. No. 93-377, 88 Stat. 472; approved on August 17, 1974; Source: 13 I.L.M. 1217 (1974).
"Source: N.P.I., San Francisco Sunday Examiner and Chronicle, April 6, 1975, p. 22, sec. A.
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must be acceptable to the relevant government and industrial elites who fund
and abide by it. The IAEA/NPT system of safeguards, by purposely not in-
fringing upon national physical protection or police intelligence networks,
maintains its acceptability; it does so at the cost of any credibility to deter non-
governmental diversion. With the physical protection burden on them, national
safeguards systems are slowly rising to the challenge with new, credible lines
of regulatory defenses; but as they push too hard, they begin to lose acceptance
from the industries they regulate, and perhaps from the cost-conscious public
who must ultimately pay the bill through taxes or increased power rates.
National and international systems must begin to interlock, to complement
each other rather than be mutually exclusive, if this vicious cycle is to be slowed
down. It will take a limited retreat from the altar of national sovereignty in the
face of a common global threat, plus a boost of resolve on the part of the IAEA
to play a more central role before we can begin to see a worldwide credible
deterrent against non-governmental nuclear diversion.
Leading nations are already showing a willingness-at least by their words,
though not yet their actions-to accord the IAEA more control in the physical
protection field. At the May, 1975 five-year NPT review conference held in
Geneva, United States and Soviet delegates agreed that international measures
are needed to deal with the threat of nuclear material theft. Igor Morokhov,
Deputy Chairman of the Soviet State Committee for Atomic Energy went so far
as to suggest that IAEA security recommendations (presumably the 1972 Grey
Book) be accepted by states as obligations.
Will the Agency take the next step, and draft appropriate tentative regulatory
and enforcement provisions? Dr. Sigvard Eklund, Swedish Director-General
of the IAEA clouded the picture at the first day of general debate in Geneva
when he first noted that the Agency had recently decided to extensively revise its
previous nuclear protection recommendations, then advocated that states
maintain national systems for guarding these materials.
Morokhov's suggestion can serve as a starting point for a final discussion
on a number of proposals being made in various forums that seek to solve the
acceptability/credibility dilemma. It seems unlikely that most nations would
readily accept IAEA Grey Book recommendations, given the cost burden that
would be placed on their economies. And the Agency itself does not appear
prepared yet to face the confrontation that would certainly ensue were it to
make the Grey Book mandatory. But growing mention of Grey Book ideas,
plus their upcoming Agency revision is a step in the right direction, even if they
remain only recommendations or international standards to be voluntarily
applied. As the proliferation of both peaceful nuclear technology, and the per-
ception of risks that goes with it, proceeds, the presence of such recommenda-
tions may enable a greater standardization and coordination of national nuclear
security systems in the near and mid-future.
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There have also been United States proposals for a National Nuclear Police
Force to handle all in-plant and in-transit SNM protection. The development of
such a force would eliminate the existing lack of coordination between the
private security forces each nuclear facility operator is presently responsible for
providing, and state or local public law enforcement agencies outside the
facility. Taking this idea one step further, the IAEA could sponsor conferences
to develop international standards of training and intelligence for nuclear pro-
tective forces. Items on the conference agenda might include indoctrination of
the force for work in this field, effective communication methods, and co-
ordinating recovery of SNM across national borders.
At that point the police intelligence field would have progressed as far as the
physical protection field: the production of a set of recommendations. As with
the Grey Book proposal, the final step could be an Agency requirement of a
national nuclear police force in each nation desiring to receive SNM for its
reactors. But, as with the earlier proposal, such an idea seems unlikely to gain
widespread acceptance: national police intelligence is one of the most closely
guarded and secretive institutions within a state's sovereign sphere.
A more modest proposal concerns the co-location of nuclear facilities, es-
pecially fuel fabrication and reprocessing plants. Such co-location eliminates
the risk of diversion at most of the critical transportation steps, and offers
convincing economies of scale. (There are disadvantages though, notable
among them the increased risk of environmental damage at the location site.)
Perhaps placing the co-location of facilities at international boundary lines-
and giving the IAEA a role in facility site selection, design, and operation-
could serve to mutually reinforce the security systems of the boundary states.
Speaking before the United Nations General Assembly on September 23,
1974, United States Secretary of State Kissinger warned of the potential for
nuclear theft and blackmail. The Secretary then commented that, "The United
States will urge the IAEA to draft an international convention for enhancing
physical security against theft or diversion of nuclear materials. Such a con-
vention should set forth specific standards and techniques for protecting
materials while in use, storage, and transfer.""
The idea of such a convention, and its ultimate end point of usefulness-
once a successful diversion occurs, prompted one expert to develop a broader
approach to deal with the problem of responding to nuclear theft as well as
preventing it. Dr. Forrest Frank, of Stanford University's Arms Control and
Disarmament Program, has taken the existing Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft30 as a model upon which to base an international
agreement to suppress nuclear theft.31 Frank's Draft Convention begins with
29United States Dept. of State Bulletin, vol. LXXI, No. 1842, October 14, 1974, p. 501.
'T.I.A.S. 7192. vol. 23, part 2 (1971), p. 1643-1684.
"Forrest R. Frank, "Suppressing Nuclear Terrorism: A Modest Proposal," unpublished paper,
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national guarantees of either extradition or prosecution of nuclear terrorists;
it continues with novel provisions to compensate persons suffering injury or
property loss as a result of the unlawful use of a nuclear explosive, as well as
assurances that stolen nuclear devices or other SNM would be returned to their
legitimate owners.
These proposals for international conventions by Dr. Kissinger and Dr.
Frank suggest a realistic and internationally acceptable approach to the prob-
lem. Once drafted, signed, and entered into force, such conventions would-
in addition to existing national safeguards-form both a credible deterrent to
diversion and a means of crisis resolution should diversion still occur. But
international conventions take years to develop and years longer to gain suf-
ficient ratifications. We cannot afford the luxury of such lengthy preparations
toward a solution, unless we concurrently work upon other, quicker means of
countering the diversionary threat. Fortunately, such quicker means are being
quietly devised.
The nuclear materials supplier states have been and continue to make
quiet bilateral arrangements on intelligence cooperation and physical security
measures. There have even been exchanges of security hardware where such
devices are not linked to still-classified weaponry hardware. At the same time,
a clear majority of the world's nuclear suppliers have unilaterally announced
tightened controls on their exports of certain nuclear items to any non-NPT
Party recipient. By the end of 1974, 13 nations (including the United States
and U.S.S.R.) had developed export requirements calling for recipients to
accept IAEA safeguards and provide assurance that the items they import will
not be re-exported by any means that could circumvent NPT objectives. 32
Such bilateral exchange arrangements, as well as the actions by the nuclear
supply oligopoly, are decidedly on the right track. They not only attack the
problem while gaining time for the development of longer term, multilateral
solutions, but provide the very framework of international cooperation and
effort that can make those longer term solutions a reality. One final, and a bit
perverse notion remains: as has happened before in human history regarding
other threats, perhaps the first major reported illicit diversion of nuclear
materials will have a beneficial effect upon the problem, either through agree-
ments to radically tighten safeguards, or through a slowing down of the spread
of nuclear energy use itself. Let us not hope that non-governmental nuclear
diversion will never occur; rather let us hope that it does not take an occurrence
to make us act.
Stanford University: June, 1975.
32IAEA Document INFCIRC/209, and 209 Addenda 1 and 3, September 3, 1974. The 13 nations
are as follow: Australia, Denmark, Canada, Finland, Norway, U.S.S.R., U.K., U.S.A., Nether-
lands, Fed. Rep. of Germany, Poland, Germ. Dem. Rep., and Hungary.
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